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Abstract
Motivated by existing multilateral rules regarding intellectual property, we de-
velop a North-South model to highlight the dual roles price controls and compul-
sory licensing play in determining Southern access to a patented Northern product.
The Northern patent-holder chooses whether and how to work its patent in the
South (either via entry or voluntarily licensing) while the South determines the
price control and whether to issue a compulsory license. The threat of compulsory
licensing bene￿ts the South and also increases global welfare when the North-
South technology gap is signi￿cant. The price control and compulsory licensing
are complementary instruments from the Southern perspective.
Keywords: Patented Goods, Compulsory Licensing, Price Controls, Quality,
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11 Introduction
Limited access to patented pharmaceuticals is a serious issue confronting developing
countries. Since the rati￿cation of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS) by the World Trade Organization (WTO), this issue has
acquired an even greater degree of urgency since local pharmaceutical industries in coun-
tries such as Brazil and India can no longer reverse-engineer patented foreign medicines
and sell them at low prices in developing country markets.1 Post TRIPS, government
across the developing world have tried to improve consumer access to medicines sold
by foreign pharmaceutical companies by imposing price controls on them. Indeed, such
controls exist even in rich countries where the public sector plays an integral role in
health care. However, a problem with using price controls to improve consumer access
is that pharmaceutical companies with patented medicines may simply refuse to sell in
markets where they ￿nd such controls to be too strict. When faced with no or limited
access to a patented foreign product, a country may choose to engage in compulsory
licensing, i.e., an authorization granted by a government to someone other than the
patent-holder to produce the product without the patent-holder￿ s consent.2 Along with
the freedom to allow parallel imports, the option to use compulsory licensing constitutes
one of the major ￿ exibilities available under TRIPS to member countries of the WTO
￿see Maskus (2000a and 2000b) for a detailed discussion of these TRIPS ￿ exibilities.
This paper develops a North-South model to analyze the dual roles played by price
controls and compulsory licensing in determining consumer access to patented foreign
products in developing countries. In the model, the Southern government sets the level
of price control on a Northern patent-holder who chooses between serving the Southern
market by entering directly or by (voluntarily) licensing its technology to a local ￿rm.3 If
the patent-holder fails to work the patent in the South, the government has the freedom
to issue a compulsory license to the local ￿rm, the quality of whose production is lower
1Existing studies indicate that the static welfare losses resulting from the TRIPS induced elimination
of low price local sellers of pharmaceuticals can be quite signi￿cant ￿see, for example, Chaudhuri,
Goldberg, and Jia (2006).
2Indeed, some observers have interpreted compulsory licensing as the "breaking of a patent" (Cahoy,
2011); what is broken is the right of a patent holder to exclude others.
3This aspect of our model is related to the literature that explores how the optimal entry strategy
used by a ￿rm to penetrate a foreign market depends upon the degree of IPR protection available in
that market. See, for example, Ethier and Markusen (1996), Markusen (2001), and McCalman (2004).
2than that of the patent-holder. As we explain below, this model is motivated by several
recent case studies of compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and the ground rules
established by TRIPS that govern the use of compulsory licensing by WTO members.
The analysis addresses several inter-related questions: How does each instrument ￿i.e. a
price control and the threat of compulsory licensing ￿a⁄ect the patent-holder￿ s decision
regarding its entry mode? What is the relationship between the two instruments? What
are their respective welfare e⁄ects? Do price controls obviate the need for compulsory
licensing?
At the time TRIPS was rati￿ed (i.e. in 1995), approximately 100 countries already
permitted some sort of compulsory licensing under their national rules and regulations
pertaining to intellectual property, with requirements for use varying across countries
(Lybecker and Fowler, 2009).4 Article 31 of TRIPS (which pertains to ￿use without
authorization of the right holder￿ ) lays down the set of conditions that govern the use of
compulsory licensing by WTO members, the most important of which are the following:
(a) the entity (company or government) applying for a compulsory license should
have been unable to obtain a voluntary licence from the right holder on "reasonable"
commercial terms;
(b) if a compulsory license is issued, ￿adequate remuneration￿must be paid to the
patent-holder; and
(c) a compulsory license must be granted mainly to supply the domestic market.5
Exactly when a country can issue a compulsory license is not explicitly addressed by
TRIPS although it does mention national emergencies, other circumstances of extreme
urgency, and anti-competitive practices as possible grounds for compulsory licensing.
Overall, it appears that countries seeking to use compulsory licensing have a fair bit
4Article 5 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (commonly known as the
Paris Convention), originally adopted in 1883, allowed signatories to adopt legislative measures ￿for the
grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive
rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work￿(Pozen, 2008). Thus, even as early as 1883,
the non-working of a patent (equivalent to not supplying a patented medicine to a particular country
in our context) was seen as justi￿able grounds for compulsory licensing.
5The last requirement ￿i.e. production under a compulsory license must be sold only in the domestic
market ￿was weakened in a landmark decision made by the WTO￿ s TRIPS Council in 2003 under which
it was decided that if a country lacked the ability to manufacture a drug locally (as is true for a large
number of developing countries) it could import it from a third party under a compulsory license. This
decision increases the options available to developing countries without a⁄ecting the patent holder￿ s
sales in other markets.
3of discretion at their disposal, something that has been a source of major concern for
pharmaceutical companies and other supporters of strong intellectual property rights.
For example, it is far from clear as to what constitutes ￿reasonable commercial terms￿ ?
Similarly, how much remuneration to the patent-holder is ￿adequate￿ ? Available evi-
dence suggests that when compulsory licensing has occurred, patent holders have tended
to receive fairly low royalty rates.6
Even though compulsory licensing is permitted under TRIPS, it has not been used
that often by developing countries. Of course, for the option to invoke compulsory li-
censing to matter, compulsory licensing need not actually be used: the threat to issue
a compulsory license can a⁄ect the behavior of patent-holders to the advantage of de-
veloping countries thereby making its use unnecessary. In this regard, it is useful to
brie￿ y discuss two prominent recent cases where compulsory licensing has been used by
Thailand and Brazil. Both cases involved the compulsory licensing of HIV/AIDS drugs,
although it seems that governments in these countries are likely to expand their reach
to issue compulsory licenses for other essential medicines.
In a case that drew signi￿cant attention in the press, on January 2007 the government
of Thailand issued a compulsory license for Kaletra, an AIDS drug, to the Government
Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) ￿a government owned Thai producer of medi-
cines.7 Regardless of one￿ s views about compulsory licensing, one aspect of the Thai
experience that is worrisome for all concerned is that the quality of the drug produced
by GPO (called GPO-vir) was sub-par ￿an aspect of production under compulsory li-
censing that is central to the model that we develop below. Indeed, the Global Fund to
Fight HIV/AIDS actually granted the GPO $133 million in 2003 so that it could up-
grade its plant to meet international quality standards. However, the Fund withdrew its
6See Scherer and Watal (2002) for a discussion of a variety of contexts in which compulsory licensing
has been used. They note that in most cases, the royalty rates paid to the patent holders have been
quite low, often being under 5%.
7The decision to issue a compulsory license was made after a study funded by the World Bank and
the health ministry in Thailand estimated that the compulsory license would save the government 100
billion bhat (roughly 3 billion USD) through 2025 and was explained by Dr. Mongkol, the Thai Health
Minister, as follows: ￿We ask for the understanding of pharmaceutical companies. Much of our a⁄ected
population cannot a⁄ord your drugs and we want people to have access to the medicines that they
need.￿He also noted that there would be no need for compulsory licensing if pharmaceutical companies
"would voluntarily reduce prices.￿(Baron, 2008). The Thai decision to issue a compulsory license was
endorsed by the Clinton Foundation, 22 US Senators, the WHO, and UNAIDS ￿the United Nations
agency responsible for coordination AIDS care and prevention in the world (Baron, 2008).
4support in 2006 since the GPO failed to meet the World Health Organization￿ s (WHO￿ s)
quality standards (Lybecker and Fowler, 2009).8
Following in Thailand￿ s footsteps, in May 2007 Brazil decided to issue a compul-
sory license for Efavirenz, another patented AIDS drug, after price negotiations with
the patent-holder (Merck) had broken down. Brazil had previously used the threat of
compulsory licensing to pressure companies to lower prices of patented medicines, but
Efavirenz was the ￿rst time a compulsory license was actually issued.9 The price ne-
gotiations with Merck were partly induced by a steady increase in the market price of
Efavirenz: the annual per-patient cost of treating patients with Efavirenz in Brazil had
increased from $1336 in 2004 to $2500 in 2006 (Daemmrich and Musacchio, 2011). As in
the Thai case, Merck o⁄ered a 30 percent price cut but Brazilian o¢ cials did not accept
its o⁄er and negotiations eventually bogged down culminating in the issuance of a ￿ve
year compulsory license for Efavirenz with a royalty rate of 1.5% to Merck (Daemmrich
and Musacchio, 2011).
However, the story did not end with the issuance of the compulsory license. It turned
out that Farmanguinhos ￿the leading government owned pharmaceutical manufacturer
in Brazil ￿was unable to manufacture Efavirenz since it lacked the technological know-
how to do so (Daemmrich and Musacchio, 2011). It eventually took Farmanguinhos two
years to be able to supply Efavirenz to the local market (at an annual cost of $210 per
patient).10 In the meantime, Brazil had to resort to importing a generic version of the
drug from India.
8A potentially lethal consequence of the sub-standard quality of GPO-vir was that almost a ￿fth of
those taking the drug (roughly 20,000 HIV-positive people) quickly developed resistance to it (Baron,
2008), prompting Lynbecker and Fowler (2009) to assert that ￿the cheap GPO solution will unques-
tionably result in greater public health problems and more expensive therapies.￿
9For example, prior to the negotiations with Merck, Brazil had threatened to issue a compulsory
license for Kaletra but did not actually do so since Abbott Laboratories agreed to lower the price of
Kaletra to $1380 per year through 2011.
10The experience of Brazil and Thailand was observed carefully by other developing countries and
could lead to an increase in the use of compulsory licensing. For example, Ecuadorian President Rafael
Correa signed a decree on October 23, 2009 allowing compulsory licenses and the National Intellectual
Property O¢ ce worked out a mechanism for issuing such licenses with the ￿rst such license being issued
in April 2010. Referring to Article 31 of TRIPS, the Ecuadorian constitution, and the WTO Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, Correa declared access to essential medicines to be of public
interest and argued that compulsory licensing was a tool for achieving general development goals, a
position that plays to the worst fears of pharmaceutical companies and seems to stretch the manner in
which compulsory licensing has been generally de￿ned and utilized.
5There are three common (and crucial) aspects of the experiences of Thailand and
Brazil with compulsory licensing. First, price considerations were a major factor in
prompting the use of compulsory licensing. Indeed, the governments seemed to have used
their power to bargain down prices as well as the option to use compulsory licensing as
tools for improving consumer access to foreign patented goods. Second, in both Thailand
and Brazil, there was essentially a single local producer that had the competence to
produce the relevant drug under a compulsory license. Third, in both instances, the
local producer￿ s quality was clearly inferior to that of the original patent-holder. We
believe that these features capture important ground realities confronting the potential
use of compulsory licensing in developing countries and the model that we develop below
puts them at center stage.
In our model, while choosing its price control, the Southern government has to decide
whether to impose a strict price control thereby inducing voluntary licensing (under
which the local production is of low quality) or to set a more lax price control that is
su¢ cient to cover the Northern patent-holder￿ s ￿xed cost of entry. Indeed, when the
local quality disadvantage is large, it is optimal for the South to not impose any price
control at all.
While a stricter price control makes direct entry less attractive to the patent-holder
relative to licensing, a more stringent compulsory licensing policy (i.e. one that results
in a low licensing fee being paid to the Northern patent-holder) has the opposite e⁄ect
on the patent-holder￿ s entry mode decision. More importantly, while a price control im-
proves consumer access by lowering price, it lowers the likelihood of the South obtaining
access to the high quality good. Thus, the two policy instruments at the disposal of the
government play rather di⁄erent roles in a⁄ecting access to the patented foreign good.
Our analysis shows that the option to use compulsory licensing necessarily increases
Southern welfare: it either lowers the licensing fee that is paid to the Northern patent-
holder or it causes a switch from licensing to entry thereby improving the quality of the
good available to Southern consumers. However, when the e⁄ect on the Northern patent-
holder is taken into account, the e⁄ects of compulsory licensing are not always bene￿cial.
In particular, while a relatively lax compulsory licensing policy (i.e. one that does not
lower the fee paid to the patent-holder too much) increases world welfare, a stringent
compulsory licensing policy can lower world welfare by inducing a suboptimal switch
6from licensing to direct entry. Furthermore, the threat of compulsory licensing has no
e⁄ect on world welfare when it leaves the patent-holder￿ s entry decision una⁄ected.
The model is also able to shed light on the nature of interaction between a price con-
trol and compulsory licensing. We ￿nd that the two policy instruments are somewhat
complementary from the Southern perspective: by shifting the patent-holder￿ s prefer-
ence in favor of entry, a stricter compulsory licensing policy allows the South to set a
more stringent price control (under entry) which raises Southern welfare. Thus, even
when the government can use a price control to improve consumer access, compulsory
licensing plays a useful role for the South by making licensing less attractive to the
patent-holder thereby allowing it to extract a greater share of the surplus. This result
resonates well with Goldberg (2010) who has argued that price regulations might need
to be complemented by compulsory licensing to ensure adequate access to medicines in
developing countries.
We focus on the policy choices of the South and abstract from the repercussions of
those choices in other markets. For example, Grossman and Lai (2008) have shown how
the Southern price control can a⁄ect Northern policy regarding exhaustion of intellectual
property rights which in turn determines prices and welfare in both regions. We also do
not consider the dynamic consequences of compulsory licensing for the South. In this
context, Moser and Voena (2012) have shown that compulsory licensing of nearly 130,000
German chemical inventions by the United States (US) after World War I under the
Trading with the Enemy Act had a substantial positive e⁄ect on subsequent innovation
by the US chemical industry. However, similar e⁄ects might not be as central to the
types of compulsory licensing considered in our model. This is due to two reasons. One,
a few isolated cases of compulsory licensing may not generate a substantial amount of
knowledge transfer. Second, even if compulsory licensing could be mobilized on a large
scale, many developing countries lack the technological capability necessary for making
e⁄ective use of licensed foreign technologies as an input into domestic innovation.
2 Model
We consider the case of a Northern ￿rm (referred to as the ￿patent-holder￿ ) that pro-
duces a good that is protected by a patent with a duration of T periods. We assume
7that the patent-holder is able to segment markets internationally, so that pro￿ts in its
home market are una⁄ected by its pricing decision in the South. There are a continuum
of Southern consumers of measure A, each of whom buys (at most) one unit of the prod-
uct. If a consumer buys the good at price p, its utility is given by U = ￿q ￿ p where q
measures quality and ￿ ￿ 0 is a taste parameter that captures the willingness to pay for
quality. For simplicity, we assume that with ￿ is uniformly distributed over the interval
[0,1]. Assuming utility under no purchase equals zero, the per-period demand d(p;q) for
the product in the South is easily calculated: d(p;q) = A
￿
1 ￿
p
q
￿
.
If the patent-holder decides to enter the Southern market and produce the good
itself its quality level equals qE and its marginal cost of production is normalized to
zero. Production by the patent-holder also requires that it incur a ￿xed entry cost of
’.11 We assume that the patent-holder faces a price ceiling, ￿ p, when selling its product
in the Southern market.
Letting ￿ be the discount factor, the present value of pro￿ts (gross of entry costs)
will be
PT
t=0 ￿
tAp(1￿
p
qE). Choosing units such that A
￿
1￿￿T+1
1￿￿
￿
= 1, the present value
of the maximum pro￿ts the patent-holder earns by selling in the South equals
￿
E(￿ p) = min[￿ p;
qE
2
]
 
1 ￿
min[￿ p;
qE
2 ]
qE
!
(1)
where
qE
2 is the unconstrained monopoly price under entry. The absence of a price
control is then equivalent to ￿ p ￿
qE
2 .
The patent-holder can also enter the South by licensing the technology to a local ￿rm
for the life of the patent. We assume that there is only a single local ￿rm with su¢ cient
capability to be an e⁄ective licensee. If there is no licensing, the local ￿rm cannot
produce the good. Under licensing, the local ￿rm￿ s quality equals qL = ￿qE, where
￿ ￿ 1 captures the quality gap between the licensee and the patent-holder. This quality
di⁄erential can be interpreted as the Southern ￿rm having a lower level of technological
capability than its Northern counterpart, and thus not being able to produce a high
quality product (as was evidenced by the experience of Thailand and Brazil). It may
11We do not distinguish between the Northern patent-holder entering the South via exporting or by
establishing a foreign subsidiary. Either mode of entry would satisfy the condition for working the
patent thereby preventing a compulsory license, and either would involve ￿xed entry costs. We assume
the patent-holder chooses the entry mode that yields it higher pro￿t.
8also re￿ ect the frictions associated with technology transfer, with more sophisticated
products having a lower level of ￿ for the licensee.
Assuming a production cost of zero for the licensee, the maximum pro￿ts resulting
from licensing over the life of the patent equal
￿
L(￿ p;￿) = min[￿ p;
￿qE
2
]
 
1 ￿
min[￿ p;
￿qE
2 ]
￿qE
!
(2)
where
￿qE
2 is the monopoly price for the licensee.
The welfare of the South equals the sum of the discounted sum of consumer surplus,
S(p;q) =
q
2(1￿
p
q)2, and the net pro￿ts of the local ￿rm. The present value of Southern
welfare under licensing is denoted W L where
W
L(￿ p;￿) = S(min[￿ p;
￿qE
2
;￿q
E) + ￿
L(￿ p;￿) ￿ f (3)
and f is the licensing fee paid to the patent-holder. Southern welfare under direct entry
is denoted W E and it comprises solely of consumer surplus that accrues to the South:
W
E(￿ p) = S(min[￿ p;
qE
2
;q
E) (4)
Thus, while licensing provides the South bene￿ts in terms of the pro￿ts of the local
￿rm (net of the license fee), these bene￿ts come at the cost of receiving a lower quality
product relative to entry.
The problem of the patent-holder is to decide how to serve the Southern market.
We assume that the Southern government has two policy instruments via which it can
in￿ uence the ￿rm￿ s entry and pricing decisions: compulsory licensing and a price control.
We analyze the interactions between the patent-holder and the Southern government
(referred to as simply ￿the government￿from hereon) as a three stage game. In the
￿rst stage, the government chooses the price ceiling to be imposed on the product in the
domestic market. The government is assumed to know the ￿rm￿ s entry cost, as well as
the quality of the product that would be produced by the patent-holder or the licensee
when making this decision. We also assume that once the price ceiling has been set, the
government is committed to that price ceiling for the remainder of the game.
At the second stage of the game, the patent-holder decides whether to enter the
market itself, to license the product to the local ￿rm, or to not sell the product at all in
9the South. We refer to a license negotiated with the Southern ￿rm at the second stage
as a voluntary license. The third stage of the game is the government￿ s compulsory
licensing decision. If the product has not been sold in the market in the second period,
either because the patent-holder chose not to enter or was unsuccessful in negotiating a
voluntary license, the government can choose to issue a compulsory license to the local
￿rm. Under a compulsory license, the local ￿rm produces the patented good as a licensee
and pays a license fee equal to a share ￿ 2 [0;1] of the pro￿ts that the patent-holder
would have earned from its best use of the patent.
The structure of the entry game in our model is intended to capture actual features of
the TRIPS agreement and the concerns of developing countries as identi￿ed in the case
studies. The TRIPS requirement that applicants for a compulsory license should have
been unable to obtain a voluntary license is re￿ ected in the assumption that the third
stage of compulsory licensing only arises if the patent-holder does not enter and there is
no agreement on a voluntary license at the second stage. The share of pro￿ts received
by the patent-holder, ￿, is assumed to re￿ ect the TRIPS requirement of a ￿adequate
remuneration￿to the patent-holder. As Scherer and Watal (2002) note in their discussion
of what constitutes adequate remuneration for the patent holder: ￿since the purpose
of virtually all known compulsory licensing schemes is to increase competitive supply
and reduce prices, the ￿ pro￿ts lost￿test cannot logically be the standard to be met in
determining compensation for compulsory licensing.￿ We interpret this as suggesting
that in practice ￿ will be quite low, which seems consistent with the payments observed
in practice. However, we also imagine that governments are not completely free in
their choice of compensation, since choosing ￿ = 0 would almost certainly result in
a complaint to the WTO. Thus, we interpret ￿ as a parameter that represents the
minimum compensation that must be paid to the patent-holder without triggering a
complaint on its part.12
The government￿ s concern about availability of the product at a reasonable price is
re￿ ected in our assumption that it can set a price ceiling for sales in the local market.
12Tandon (1982) provides a model in which both the length of a patent as well as the royalty rate,
given that the cost-reducing innovation is subject to compulsory licensing, are optimally determined.
It should be noted that Tandon￿ s de￿nition of compulsory licensing di⁄ers from that applied by the
WTO, in that he allows compulsory licenses to be granted even if the patent is being worked by the
patent-holder. With a perfectly elastic supply of potential licensees, this yields a perfectly competitive
industry equilibrium in the product market.
10Since the patent-holder incurs a ￿xed cost of entry if it serves the market itself, there
is a potential holdup problem if the government has the ability to alter the price ceiling
once the patent-holder has made its entry decision. To avoid this issue, we assume that
the government is able to commit to the price ceiling prior to the entry decision.
In the next section we present the analysis starting from stage two onward, which we
refer to as the compulsory licensing game. In cases where the government does not have
price ceilings available as a policy instrument or where the price ceiling has been set
exogenously by a di⁄erent government agency, there will be no ￿rst stage to the entry
game. If the government does choose to impose a price ceiling, the compulsory licensing
game is a proper subgame of the three stage game, given the price ceiling chosen at stage
one. The analysis of the ￿rst stage, which endogenizes the price ceiling, is presented in
section 4. This approach allows us to highlight the impact of compulsory licensing as a
policy instrument for a given level of the price ceiling, and thus to contrast the e⁄ects of
the compulsory license and price ceiling as alternative policy tools that a⁄ect Southern
access to the patented Northern good.
3 The Compulsory Licensing Game
We solve the compulsory licensing game by backward induction. At stage three, the
government must decide whether or not to grant a compulsory license if the product
has not been sold in the market at stage two. We assume that stage two takes one
period, so that a compulsory license granted at stage three provides the licensee with
the right to produce the good for T ￿ 1 periods. The present value of pro￿ts earned
by the licensee under a compulsory license is ￿￿L(￿ p;￿), where ￿ =
1￿￿T
1￿￿T+1 < 1 is the
discount applied to the licensee￿ s pro￿ts due to the shortened horizon for the patent.
Similarly, the patent-holder would earn a net return of ￿￿E(￿ p)￿’ from entering at the
third stage of the game. Since under compulsory licensing the fee paid by the Southern
￿rm/licensee is assumed to equal a share ￿ of the net pro￿ts that the latter would have
earned in its most pro￿table use of the patent, the compulsory licensing fee is given by
f
CL = ￿max[￿￿
E(￿ p) ￿ ’;￿￿
L(￿ p;￿)] (5)
A lower value of ￿ re￿ ects a stricter compulsory licensing policy, in that it reduces the
11compensation paid to the patent-holder.13
With the compulsory licensing fee given by (5), we can substitute into the Southern
welfare function (3) to obtain the payo⁄to the government under compulsory licensing:
W
CL = ￿
￿
S(min[￿ p;
￿qE
2
];￿q
E) + ￿
L(￿ p;￿)
￿
￿ ￿max[￿￿
E(￿ p) ￿ ’;￿￿
L(￿ p;￿)] (6)
In order for compulsory licensing to be a credible threat in the voluntary licensing game,
we require that the government prefers issuing a compulsory license to the outcome that
would occur if no compulsory license were o⁄ered. We assume that the government
believes that if it does not give a compulsory license, the product will not be o⁄ered in
the market, in which case Southern welfare equals zero. This implies that compulsory
licensing is a credible threat whenever W CL > 0:
If ’ ￿ ￿
￿
￿E(￿ p) ￿ ￿L(￿ p;￿)
￿
, then the pro￿ts of the licensee exceed the licensing
fee under compulsory licensing and W CL > 0. If ’CL < ￿
￿
￿E(￿ p) ￿ ￿L(￿ p;￿)
￿
, it is
possible that the cost of the compulsory license exceeds the pro￿ts that earned by the
license. Compulsory licensing is still possible in this case as long as the losses of the
licensee are less than the amount of consumer surplus generated by the compulsory
license (where we assume the government subsidizes the local ￿rm to ensure participation
if ￿￿L(￿ p;￿) ￿ fCL < 0). Since lim
￿!0S(min[￿ p;
￿qE
2 ];￿qE) + ￿L(￿ p;￿) = 0, there exists ￿
su¢ ciently small such that the total surplus generated for Southern consumers and the
licensee is insu¢ cient to cover the fee paid to the patent-holder. Thus, compulsory
licensing fails to be a credible threat for some levels of the ￿xed cost ’ if the South￿ s
product quality is so low that W CL < 0. We can thus de￿ne
’
CL ￿ max[argmin
’ W
CL ￿ 0;0] (7)
to be the threshold value of the entry cost above which the government issues the
compulsory license if the patent-holder fails to work the patent locally.14 The following
13The nature of our results would not be a⁄ected if compensation under compulsory licensing is
speci￿ed as a minimum royalty rate per unit that must be paid to the patent-holder. Since the primary
role of compensation under compulsory licensing is to serve as a threat point in the bargaining game
under voluntary licensing, what matters in terms of equilibrium outcomes is the total payment that is
received by the patent-holder in the event of licensing.
14An alternative assumption would be that the government believes that if it does not issue a com-
pulsory license, the patent-holder chooses its pro￿t maximizing mode of entry. Under this assumption,
’CL = ￿(￿E(￿ p) ￿ ￿L(￿ p;￿)). The qualitative nature of our results does not depend on which of these
assumptions is used.
12result can now be stated:
Lemma 1: If the product is not supplied to the South as a result of the stage two
negotiations, the government issues a compulsory license to the local ￿rm i⁄ ’ > ’CL
where ’CL is given by (7) and ’CL < ￿
￿
￿E(￿ p) ￿ ￿L(￿ p;￿)
￿
. If compulsory licensing
occurs, the patent-holder receives the license fee given in (5).
3.1 The Firm￿ s Decision
We now turn to stage two where the patent-holder makes its decision on how to utilize
the patent in the South market. If the patent-holder enters the Southern market, it
earns a return of ￿E(￿ p)￿’. If it chooses to license the product to the Southern ￿rm, it
engages in a bargaining game with the Southern ￿rm to determine the size of the license
fee fV L that it receives. Given these payo⁄s, the patent-holder￿ s optimal decision is as
follows:
(i) enter if ￿E(￿ p) ￿ ’ ￿ max[0;fV L];
(ii) choose voluntary licensing if there is a licensing fee that is acceptable to the
Southern ￿rm and the fee satis￿es fV L > max[0;￿E(￿ p) ￿ ’]; and
(iii) not work the patent in the South otherwise.
We assume that the bargaining game for licensing is one in which the patent-holder
makes a take it or leave it o⁄er to the Southern ￿rm. If the o⁄er is accepted then the
Southern ￿rm acts as a licensee and pays the fee fV L. If the o⁄er is rejected then the
Southern ￿rm can request a compulsory license from its government in the next period.
In the absence of compulsory licensing or if the Southern government were choose not to
grant a compulsory license in response to a request from the South ￿rm, the Southern
￿rm earns zero pro￿ts if it rejects the patent-holder￿ s o⁄er of a license. The maximum
license fee that the patent-holder can earn is fV L = ￿L(￿ p;￿), which drives the Southern
￿rm to zero pro￿ts. When the threat of compulsory licensing is credible (i.e. ’ ￿ ’CL
from Lemma 1), the best the patent-holder can do in the voluntary licensing game
is to make the Southern ￿rm indi⁄erent between paying fV L and waiting to obtain a
compulsory license in the next period. The present value payo⁄ to the Southern ￿rm
in the event of compulsory licensing will be (1 ￿ ￿)￿L(￿ p;￿) where ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)),
so the maximum fee that the patent-holder can charge under voluntary licensing is
13fV L = ￿￿L(￿ p;￿).
Given that the threat of compulsory licensing is credible, the condition for the patent-
holder to prefer voluntary licensing (with the fee fV L) to entry is
’ > ￿￿
E(￿ p;￿;￿) ￿ ￿
E(￿ p) ￿ ￿￿
L(￿ p;￿): (8)
When compulsory licensing is not a credible threat, the patent-holder captures all of
the licensee￿ s pro￿ts and it prefers entry to licensing if ’ > ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1). Using (8) and
Lemma 1, we have the following chain of inequalities:
￿￿
E(￿ p;￿;￿) > ￿￿
E(￿ p;￿;1) ￿ ￿
￿
￿
E(￿ p) ￿ ￿
L(￿ p;￿)
￿
> ’
CL
These inequalities can be interpreted as follows. Since ￿ < 1, when compulsory licensing
is a credible threat the patent-holder captures only a share of the pro￿ts under licensing
and thus ￿nds entry relatively more attractive. The second inequality simply says that,
given that compulsory licensing is credible, if the patent holder prefers licensing to entry
in the second period then it also prefers it in the ￿rst period.
By lemma 1, if the patent-holder prefers licensing in the second period then it is
optimal for the government to issue a compulsory license so as to lower the rent trans-
ferred to the patent-holder. Foreseeing this, the patent-holder chooses voluntary li-
censing in the ￿rst period with a fee of fV L = ￿￿L(￿ p;￿) for ’ > ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿). For
’ 2 [’CL;￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)], the patent-holder opts for entry in the ￿rst period: in this re-
gion, the threat of compulsory licensing serves to lower the fee that the patent-holder can
potentially collect under voluntary licensing. Finally, for ’ < ’CL compulsory licensing
is not credible. The patent holder￿ s entry costs are su¢ ciently low in this region that
it prefers entry even though it can extract all of the licensee￿ s pro￿ts under voluntary
licensing. Thus, the patent holder necessarily prefers entry when compulsory licensing is
not credible.
These arguments establish the following result:
Proposition 1: In the compulsory licensing game, the patent-holder enters at the ￿rst
stage if ’ < ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿) whereas it issues a voluntary license with the license fee fV L =
￿￿L(￿ p;￿) if ’ ￿ ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿) where ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)).
Under our assumptions, compulsory licensing is not observed in equilibrium since
the equilibrium involves either entry or the issuance of a voluntary license at the ￿rst
14stage. In other words, by working the patent, the patent-holder preempts the use of
compulsory licensing by the government. However, the possibility of compulsory licens-
ing strengthens the bargaining position of the Southern ￿rm for all values of the entry
cost ’ for which the government￿ s threat to issue a compulsory license is credible. In
addition, the existence of compulsory a⁄ects the entry decision of the patent-holder by
altering the range of entry costs over which it chooses to grant a voluntary license.
We can use Proposition 1 to derive results for the e⁄ect of changes in ￿ and other
parameter changes on the patent-holder￿ s entry decision. Using (1) and (2), this pro￿t
di⁄erential can be expressed as
￿￿
E(￿ p;￿;￿) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
(1￿￿￿)qE
4 ￿ p ￿
qE
2
￿ p(1 ￿
￿ p
qE) ￿
￿￿qE
4
￿qE
2 < ￿ p <
qE
2
￿ p(1 ￿ ￿) +
￿ p2
qE
￿
￿￿￿
￿
￿
￿ p <
￿qE
2
(9)
Di⁄erentiation of (9) yields the following result:
Corollary 1:
(a) As the price control becomes more lax (i.e. ￿ p increases) for ￿ p <
qE
2 , the threshold
value of the entry cost ’ above which voluntary licensing is preferred to entry by the
patent-holder increases (
@￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)
@￿ p > 0).
(b) As the share of licensee pro￿ts captured by the patent holder in a voluntary license
(￿) increases, the threshold above which licensing is preferred decreases, (
@￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)
@￿ <
0).
(c) As the quality of the licensee￿ s product (￿) increases, the threshold above which
licensing is preferred decreases (
@￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)
@￿ < 0).
The intuition for why entry becomes more likely as the price control becomes more lax
is quite straightforward: a price control is more binding under entry since the optimal
price under entry is relatively higher. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between
￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿) and ￿ p for ￿ = :5 and ￿ 2 f:3;:7;1g. For ￿ p <
￿qE
2 , the price control binds
for both the licensee and the entrant. Over this range, increases in the price control
raise the pro￿ts of entry more than those for licensing for all ￿ < 1 due to the entrant￿ s
15higher volume of sales. For
￿qE
2 < ￿ p 2 [
￿qE
2 ;
qE
2 ); the price control binds for the entrant
but not the licensee. Relaxing the price control increases the pro￿t under entry in this
region but has no e⁄ect on licensing pro￿ts since the price control exceeds the optimal
price of the licensee. For ￿ p ￿
qE
2 , the price control does not bind for either the licensee
or the entrant. As a result, the range over which the threat of compulsory licensing
induces a switch from licensing to entry on the part of the patent-holder shrinks as
the price control becomes tighter. An important implication of this is that while a
price control can improve access by lowering price, it cannot induce a switch to direct
entry on the part of the patent-holder and cannot therefore increase the likelihood of
the local economy obtaining access to the high quality good. This suggests that the
two instruments (compulsory licensing and price controls) play rather di⁄erent roles
in a⁄ecting access to patented goods in developing countries ￿a theme to which we
return later. Furthermore, as we noted earlier, the low quality of licensed production is
indeed an important practical consideration for developing countries and stringent price
controls work against the objective of improving the quality of drugs available to local
consumers.
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Figure 1: Pro￿t Di⁄erential Between Entry and Licensing
An increase in the patent holder￿ s share of licensing pro￿t that accrues to the patent-
holder under the shadow of compulsory licensing, ￿, or an increase in the quality of the
licensee￿ s product, ￿, will make licensing more makes licensing more attractive and
raise the entry threshold. The e⁄ects of changes in ￿ on the licensing threshold are
16illustrated in Figure 1. The parameter ￿ captures two features of the rules regarding
compulsory licensing that a⁄ect the licensee￿ s return through its impact on the threat
value of compulsory licensing. One is the level of compensation that must be paid
to the patent holder, because a lower ￿ reduces the equilibrium license payment under
voluntary licensing. The second feature is the delay required before compulsory licensing
can be enforced. Greater delay results in a lower value place on future returns, ￿, as
well as a shorter horizon over which returns can be earned from the patent (i.e. lower
￿). Each of these aspects of delay reduces the value to the licensee of waiting for a
compulsory license, and thus reduces the equilibrium license payment.
3.2 Welfare
Proposition 1 can be used to evaluate the impact of introducing the option to issue
a compulsory license on the welfare of the South and of the world as a whole. First
consider Southern welfare. For ’ ￿ ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿), the South is better o⁄ when it can
use compulsory licensing. In this range licensing occurs with or without compulsory
licensing, but the credible threat of compulsory licensing shifts pro￿ts from the patent-
holder to the licensee by lowering the licensing fee fV L by the amount (1 ￿ ￿)￿L(￿ p;￿).
For ’ < ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1), compulsory licensing has no e⁄ect on Southern welfare be-
cause the Northern patent-holder enters with or without compulsory licensing. For
’ 2 [￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1);￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)), the threat of compulsory licensing causes the entrant
to switch from voluntary licensing to entry. Since the licensee obtains no surplus in the
absence of compulsory licensing, we have from (3) and (4) that the e⁄ect of this switch
on South welfare equals
S(min[￿ p;
qE
2
];q
E) ￿ S(min[￿ p;
￿qE
2
];￿q
E) > 0
The South bene￿ts from the switch from licensing to entry on the part of the patent-
holder because consumers obtain greater consumer surplus from the higher quality of
the entrant. Thus, we obtain the result that the South is at least as well o⁄ under
compulsory licensing for all values of ’.
Proposition 2: The ability to use compulsory licensing increases Southern welfare for
all levels of entry costs at which licensing occurs, and also for all entry costs for which
compulsory licensing induces the patent-holder to switch from licensing to entry.
17Consider world welfare next. Since the licensing fee is merely a transfer pro￿t from
the local Southern ￿rm to the patent-holder, aggregate world welfare equals the sum of
the patent-holder￿ s pro￿t and Southern consumer surplus. For ’ ￿ ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿), world
welfare is una⁄ected by compulsory licensing because it merely transfers a share of ￿
of the pro￿t from the patent-holder to the local licensee. The existence of compulsory
licensing also has no e⁄ect on world welfare for ’ < ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1) because it does not
alter the patent-holder￿ s entry decision.
For ’ 2 [￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1);￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)), the patent-holder switches from voluntary li-
censing to entry with the introduction of a compulsory licensing regime. The di⁄erence
between world welfare under compulsory licensing and world welfare without compulsory
licensing is
WW(￿ p;￿;￿) ￿ WW(￿ p;￿;1) =
￿
S(min[￿ p;
qE
2
];q
E) ￿ S(min[￿ p;
￿qE
2
];￿q
E)
￿
(10)
+
￿
￿￿
E(￿ p;￿;1) ￿ ’
￿
Equation (10) identi￿es two con￿ icting e⁄ects of compulsory licensing on world wel-
fare in this interval. The ￿rst term must be positive for ￿ < 1 and re￿ ects the
fact that increased entry under compulsory licensing raises consumer welfare by pro-
viding consumers with a higher quality product. The second term is non-positive on
’ 2 (￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1);￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)) because the switch by the patent-holder from licensing
to entry in the compulsory licensing regime lowers its pro￿ts. The former e⁄ect neces-
sarily dominates for entry costs su¢ ciently close to ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1). However, there exists
a critical value of the entry cost, which we denote by ’G, such that (10) is negative for
’ > ’G. Therefore, if ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿) > ’G, the existence of compulsory licensing reduces
world welfare when the entry cost satis￿es ’ 2 (’G;￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)]:
The following proposition, proven in the Appendix, establishes conditions under
which world welfare may decline for some levels of ￿xed costs under compulsory licensing.
Proposition 3: Compulsory licensing has no e⁄ect on world welfare when it does not
a⁄ect the patent-holder￿ s decision regarding its mode of entry into the Southern market.
For ’ 2 [￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1);￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)), there exists a ￿￿(￿ p;￿) 2 [0;1) such that:
(a) if ￿ ￿ ￿￿(￿ p;￿), compulsory licensing increases world welfare for all values of
entry costs in the interval and
18(b) if ￿ < ￿￿(￿ p;￿), there exists a ’G 2 (￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1);￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)) such that com-
pulsory licensing increases world welfare for ’ 2 [￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1);’G) whereas it decreases
world welfare for ’ 2 (’G;￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)].
The intuition for this result is simple. As compulsory licensing becomes more strin-
gent the ￿rm is more prone to choosing entry as established in Proposition 1. However,
the threshold ’G below which entry is more desirable than licensing from a global wel-
fare perspective is independent of ￿ because ￿ merely determines how pro￿ts are shared
between the patent-holder and the licensee. If the compulsory licensing regime is not
too strict, in the sense that ￿ ￿ ￿￿(￿ p;￿), it results in a welfare improvement for all
’ at which the patent-holder switches from voluntary licensing to entry. However, if
￿￿(￿ p;￿) > 0, there exist compulsory regimes su¢ ciently strict that world welfare is re-
duced by the switch from entry to voluntary licensing. The impact of various parameters
on this threshold value of ￿ is given in:
Proposition 4: The critical value ￿￿(￿ p;￿) above which compulsory licensing increases
world welfare over ’ 2 [￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1);￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)) has the following properties:
(a) @￿￿
@￿ p ￿ 0 with strict inequality for ￿￿(￿ p;￿) 2 (0;1) and ￿ p 2 (0;
qE
2 ).
(b) @￿￿
@￿ ￿ 0, with ￿￿(￿ p;￿) = 0 for ￿ ￿ 1
3 and ￿￿(￿ p;1) = 1.
Part (b) shows that compulsory licensing is more likely to be damaging to world
welfare for some values of ’ in cases where the licensee produces a high quality product.
This can be illustrated using the case where the price ceiling does not bind, which yields
￿￿(￿ p;￿) = min[3
2 ￿ 1
2￿;0]: For ￿ ￿ 1
3, the licensee is so ine¢ cient relative to the patent-
holder that the switch from licensing to entry induced by the existence of compulsory
licensing must raise world welfare. The large quality gap means that the e⁄ect of entry
on consumer surplus must dominate any loss in ￿rm pro￿ts. For ￿ > 1
3, on the other
hand, the quality of the licensee￿ s product is su¢ ciently high that entry occurs for some
’ > ’G when ￿ < 3
2 ￿ 1
2￿. The fact that the threshold ￿￿ equals unity when there is
no North-South technology gap (i.e. ￿ = 1) means that the inequality ￿ ￿ ￿￿(1) is
necessarily satis￿ed and the ￿rm chooses entry over the range ’ 2 [’G(1);￿￿E(1;￿))
whereas licensing is globally optimal for any positive ’. Part (a) shows that a stricter
price control makes it less likely that compulsory licensing is damaging to world welfare.
19This occurs because a stricter price control raises consumer surplus relatively more under
entry than for licensing due to the larger output sold by the patent-holder.
4 Endogenous Price Ceiling
We now extend the analysis by allowing the government to choose the price ceiling ￿ p. We
assume that the government can commit to a price ceiling prior to the entry decision
of the patent-holder, so that the price ceiling decision is modeled by augmenting the
compulsory licensing game with a stage 0 in which the government chooses ￿ p.15 In
making its pricing decision, the government takes into account the impact of the price
control on the entry decision of the patent-holder in the compulsory licensing game.
If follows from Corollary 1 that for ’ 2 (0;￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;￿)), there exists a reservation
price, pE, at which the patent-holder is indi⁄erent between entry and licensing. This
reservation price is the solution to ’ = ￿￿E(pE;￿;￿). Corollary 1 also ensures that for
entry costs in this interval, we can use the implicit function theorem to obtain pE(’;￿;￿),
which has the following properties:
Lemma 2: The reservation price pE(’;￿;￿) above which the patent-holder prefers entry
to licensing is increasing in ’;￿, and ￿ for ’ 2 (0;￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;￿)).
Intuitively, factors that increase the attractiveness of licensing, such as an increase
in entry cost, a decline in the stringency of compulsory licensing policy, or an increase
in the productivity of the licensee, raise the reservation value for entry because the
patent-holder has to be compensated for foregoing the voluntary license. The e⁄ect
of an increase in ￿ on the reservation value is illustrated in Figure 1. Proposition 1
establishes that the patent-holder enters if ￿ p ￿ pE(’;￿;￿) which means that Southern
welfare equals S(￿ p;qE) for ￿ p 2 [pE(’;￿;￿);
q
2]. Since consumer surplus is decreasing in
the price ceiling, setting ￿ p = pE(’;￿;￿) maximizes Southern welfare over the set of price
controls for which the ￿rm enters.
15It should be noted that, in this model, the patent-holder would never enter the South in the absence
of such a commitment, because the government￿ s welfare would be maximized by setting ￿ p equal to the
entrant￿ s marginal cost if it made the decision post entry. Indeed, as the available case study evidence
suggests, price negotations generally tend to occur prior to entry/licensing decisions of patent holders.
20For ￿ p 2 [0;pE(’;￿;￿)) or ’ > ￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;￿), the patent-holder chooses licensing and
Southern welfare is given by
S(min[￿ p;
￿￿ q
2
];￿￿ q) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
L(￿ p;￿)
Since the sum of consumer surplus and ￿rm pro￿ts is maximized at marginal cost, ￿ p = 0
maximizes Southern welfare over the set of price controls for which the ￿rm chooses
licensing. This discussion implies that the government￿ s optimal policy is either to
choose a price of 0 and obtain a product with quality ￿qE from the licensee or to choose
a price equal to the patent-holder￿ s reservation price pE(’;￿;￿) and obtain a higher
quality product. This policy results in entry with price equal to the ￿rm￿ s reservation
price when ’ ￿ ￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;￿) and licensing at ￿ p = 0 otherwise. The former yields a
surplus of a surplus S(pE;qE) while the latter yields S(0;￿qE) =
￿qE
2 . A comparison
of these outcomes yields the optimal decision rule for the government regarding price
controls:
Proposition 5: If the reservation price for entry by the patent-holder, pE(’;￿;￿),
is no greater than pS(￿) ￿ qE(1 ￿
p
￿), the government chooses ￿ p = pE(’;￿;￿). If
pE(’;￿;￿) > pS(￿), the government sets the price control to the licensee￿ s break even
price (which is zero) and the ￿rm chooses licensing.
If ￿ ￿ 1=4, then pS(￿) ￿
qE
2 . Over this range the quality of the licensee￿ s product is so
low that the government does not impose any price control on the entrant since it is never
optimal to induce licensing. As a result, the market outcome coincides with that which
obtains in the absence of a price control. For ￿ 2 (1=4;1], we have pS(￿) 2 [0;
qE
2 ). Here,
the technology disadvantage su⁄ered by the local producer is not so large that entry is
always preferable from the South￿ s viewpoint. Entry occurs with a binding price control
at the entrant￿ s reservation price pE(’;￿;￿) when ’ ￿ ￿￿E(pS(￿);￿;￿) and licensing
at ￿ p = 0 otherwise.
Combining these results, the maximum level of entry costs at which the ￿rm enters
under compulsory licensing and the South￿ s optimal price control is given by
￿(￿;￿) = ￿￿
E(min[p
S(￿);
qE
2
];￿;￿)
21Using (9), we obtain
￿(￿;￿) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
(1￿￿￿)qE
4 ￿ ￿ 1
4
qE ￿p
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
1 + ￿
4
￿￿
1
4 < ￿ ￿ 2(2 ￿
p
3)
qE
￿
￿
￿ ￿ 2
p
￿￿ + ￿3=2(1 + ￿) ￿ ￿2￿
￿ > 2(2 ￿
p
3)
(11)
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 2. Entry occurs for values of the ￿xed cost ’
lying below the ￿(￿;￿) curve, and licensing for values above it. As compulsory licensing
becomes stricter, the threshold level of ￿xed cost below which entry occurs increases.
Increases in the technology gap ￿ have two e⁄ects on the entry threshold under an
optimal price control. The direct e⁄ect is to make raises the pro￿tability of licensing
for a given ￿ p. The second e⁄ect, which arises if ￿ > 1
4, is to lower the maximum price
ceiling the government is willing to allow for an entrant. Both of these e⁄ects work in
the direction of reducing the maximum value of ’ below which the patent-holder prefers
entry to licensing, so the ￿(￿;￿) locus must be downward sloping as illustrated in Figure
2. Increases in ￿ raise the attractiveness of licensing, leading to a downward shift in the
locus.
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Figure 2: Threshold for Licensing with Price Controls
4.1 Price Controls, Compulsory Licensing, and Entry
Proposition 1 established that in the absence of compulsory licensing or price controls,
a stricter compulsory licensing regime expands the range of entry costs over which the
22patent-holder enters, since ￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;￿) is decreasing in ￿. The corollary to Proposition
1 showed that stricter price controls reduce the pro￿ts from entry relatively more than
those from voluntary licensing, leading to a reduction in the range of entry costs for
which the ￿rm enters. These results indicate that introducing price controls and com-
pulsory licensing have con￿ icting e⁄ects on entry. This raises the question of whether
the introduction of compulsory licensing and price controls together leads to more or
less entry than would have occurred without either policy instrument being employed.
The threshold under entry without compulsory licensing or price controls is ￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;1) =
(1￿￿)qE
4 , which as illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 2. The threshold with price
controls and compulsory licensing is ￿(￿;￿), so the combined policies yield greater entry
if ￿(￿;￿) > ￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;1). For ￿ ￿ 1
4, the government is willing to allow a price control
of up to
qE
2 to ensure entry of the patent-holder, so ￿(￿;￿) ￿ ￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;1) =
￿(1￿￿)qE
4 .
Price controls and compulsory licensing yield a higher level of entry for all ￿ < 1 and
￿ ￿ 1
4. In this case the technology gap is su¢ ciently large that the government is willing
to forego restrictions on prices for the marginal entrant, so the increase in bargaining
power of the licensee due to compulsory licensing expands the range of entry costs over
which the ￿rm prefers to enter. For ￿ > 1
4, on the other hand, the technology gap is
smaller and price controls bind for the marginal entrant. For ￿ = 1 and ￿ > 1
4, we have
less entry with price controls because ￿(￿;1) < ￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;1) as illustrated in Figure 2.
It then follows that the combined use of compulsory licensing and price controls leads
to less entry for ￿ su¢ ciently close to 1.
As compulsory licensing becomes stricter, the ￿(￿;￿) locus shifts upward in Figure
2 and the range of values of ￿ for which compulsory licensing and price controls lead to
greater entry expands. This is illustrated by the comparison of the ￿(￿;:7) locus and the
￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;1) line in Figure 2 ￿the threshold that determines the ￿rm￿ s choice between
entry and licensing in the absence of either instrument. Furthermore, we can establish
that the combined policies of compulsory licensing and price controls lead to more entry
for ￿ su¢ ciently small. Using (11), ￿(￿;0) ￿ ￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;1) =
qE
4 (4
p
￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿ 1) > 0
for ￿ 2 (1
4;1). Therefore, ￿(￿;￿) ￿ ￿￿E(
qE
2 ;￿;1) > 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1) for ￿ su¢ ciently
close to 0.
234.2 Welfare E⁄ects of Compulsory Licensing and Price Con-
trols
The ability to vary the level of the price control provides a second instrument for the
government. Proposition 2 shows that for a given level of ￿ it is in the interest of
the government to reduce the price to the minimum level consistent with the desired
entry/licensing outcome, so that the use of price controls yields a higher welfare level
than can be obtained with compulsory licensing alone.
Price controls have two features that make them a useful instrument for the govern-
ment. One is that they a⁄ect Southern welfare whether the patent-holder chooses entry
or licensing. This contrasts with compulsory licensing, which does not a⁄ect the payo⁄
of patent holders who would enter even in the absence of compulsory licensing when the
price control is exogenous. A second feature is that price controls can be negotiated
on a case by case basis, so that the government can tailor the control to maximize the
surplus for a given entry cost.
A natural question to ask is whether the ability of the government to set a price
control makes compulsory licensing a redundant policy instrument. To address this
question, consider the e⁄ect of a change in ￿ on the payo⁄ to the government for a case
with ’ < ￿(￿;￿), which is S(pE(’;￿;￿);qE). A stricter compulsory licensing policy
lowers the entry threshold of the patent-holder, since pE(’;￿;￿) is increasing in ￿. This
results in an increase in Southern welfare due to the reduced price. Note, however,
that compulsory licensing still plays a useful role for the government because it makes
licensing less attractive to the ￿rm, which allows the South to extract greater surplus
from an entering ￿rm. Thus, compulsory licensing and price controls are complementary
instruments from the point of view of the government.
From the perspective of world welfare, a change in ￿ p a⁄ects welfare through two
channels. The ￿rst channel is the e⁄ect of a change in ￿ p on consumer surplus and the
patent-holder￿ s pro￿ts for a given production mode. Since an increase in the price ceiling
reduces consumer surplus by more than the increase in pro￿ts, the imposition of price
controls raises welfare for all values of ’ so long as the mode of entry does not change.
The second channel is the e⁄ect of the price control on the entry decision of the marginal
patent-holder, which is given by
@￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)
@￿ p > 0 in Proposition 1. A switch from licensing
24to entry raises consumer surplus by the amount
S(min[￿ p;
qE
2
];q
E) ￿ S(min[￿ p;
￿qE
2
];￿q
E)
while the impact on pro￿ts is given by ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1) ￿ ’. Since the marginal ￿rm earns
a pro￿t of ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿), a switch from entry to licensing reduces worldwide pro￿ts by
(1 ￿ ￿)￿L(￿ p;￿). Therefore, a switch from entry to licensing as a result of an increase in
￿ p raises world welfare if
￿
S(min[￿ p;
qE
2
];q
E) ￿ S(min[￿ p;
￿qE
2
];￿q
E)
￿
+ (￿ ￿ 1)￿
L(￿ p;￿q
E) > 0
which is equivalent to the requirement that
￿ > ￿
￿(￿ p;￿)
Thus, a reduction in the price ceiling causes the marginal patent-holder to switch from
entry to voluntary licensing, which has a favorable e⁄ect on world welfare i⁄￿ < ￿
￿(￿ p;￿).
Proposition 3 established conditions under which the use of compulsory licensing caused
a suboptimal switch from voluntary licensing to entry. Since the price ceiling has the
opposite e⁄ect on the marginal patent-holder￿ s decision (i.e. causes a switch from entry
to voluntary licensing), the e⁄ect of this switch on world welfare is positive.
5 Conclusion
High prices or outright unavailability of patented foreign goods (such as pharmaceuticals)
often prompt governments to undertake policies that can potentially improve consumer
access. The two types of policies that have been used frequently in this context are price
controls and compulsory licensing. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no formal
analysis of the role these policies play in improving consumer access to patented foreign
goods as well as of their welfare e⁄ects more generally. Given the human welfare cost at
stake, it is imperative that our understanding of these policies be improved. Motivated
by the rules speci￿ed in the TRIPS agreement and the actual experience of several
developing countries with compulsory licensing, this paper develops a model that sheds
light on the e⁄ects of compulsory licensing as well as its interaction with price controls.
25The model is designed to capture actual WTO rules quite closely. In particular,
the Southern government is allowed to use compulsory licensing only if the Northern
￿rm/patent-holder fails to work the patent locally. However, since monopoly pricing
by the patent-holder can erode consumer access, we also allow the South to impose a
price control on the patent-holder. The analysis provides several insights. First, the two
instruments play rather di⁄erent roles in terms of how they a⁄ect the patent-holder￿ s
decision to work the patent in the South: while the threat of compulsory licensing en-
courages entry, the use of a price control encourages voluntary licensing. This di⁄erence
matters in our model because, consistent with the available case study evidence on com-
pulsory licensing, the quality of production of the Southern licensee is below that of the
patent-holder if it chooses to enter directly. Our results not only point to some clear
distinctions between the two types of policy instruments, they also expose their limits
in terms of improving consumer access to patented foreign goods. After all, if local
technological capability is substantially lacking, too stringent a price control on the part
of a developing country can simply prompt the patent-holder to not work the patent
at all. Similarly, if local production su⁄ers from too large a quality gap, the threat of
compulsory licensing loses bite.
An important, albeit somewhat straightforward, result is that the option to use com-
pulsory licensing bene￿ts the South by either improving the terms at which voluntary
licensing occurs or by causing the Northern patent-holder to switch from licensing to en-
try. The ￿rst channel implies that the South earns some rents from the licensing contract
while the second channel leads to an improvement in the quality of the good available
to local consumers. However, the e⁄ects of compulsory licensing on global welfare are
not always sanguine: while a relatively lax compulsory licensing policy increases world
welfare, too strict a compulsory licensing policy can lower it by inducing a suboptimal
switch from licensing to entry. Finally, we show that a price control and compulsory
licensing are complementary policy tools for the South: a stricter compulsory licensing
policy makes it possible for the South to lower the price control under entry thereby
improving consumer access.
266 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: Since (10) is decreasing in ’, compulsory licensing raises world
welfare for all ’ 2 (￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1);￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)) if (10) is non-negative when evaluated at
’ = ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿). Therefore, compulsory licensing raises welfare for all values of ’ at
which patent holders switch from licensing to entry if
￿
S(min[￿ p;
qE
2
];q
E) ￿ S(min[￿ p;
￿qE
2
];￿q
E)
￿
+ (￿ ￿ 1)￿
L(￿ p;￿q
E) > 0 (A1)
The ￿rst term in parentheses is positive for ￿ 2 [0;1) as established in the text, so (A1)
must be satis￿ed for ￿ = 1. Since (A1) is decreasing in ￿, then ￿￿(￿ p;￿) is the in￿mum
over ￿ 2 [0;1] such that (A1) is satis￿ed. World welfare will be increased as a result of
compulsory licensing for all ’ 2 (￿￿E(￿ p;￿;1);￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)) if ￿ ￿ ￿￿, which establishes
(a). For ￿￿(￿ p;￿) > 0, ’G = ￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿￿(￿ p;￿)). If ￿ < ￿￿, welfare will decrease as a
result of compulsory licensing for ’ 2 (’G;￿￿E(￿ p;￿;￿)).jj
Proof of Proposition 4: For ￿ p ￿
qE
2 , (A1) simpli￿es to
qE
8
￿
1 + 2~ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿
> 0.
This yields ￿￿(
qE
2 ;￿) = min[3
2 ￿ 1
2￿;0], which is independent of ￿ p and non-decreasing in
￿, with ￿￿(￿ p;￿) = 0 for ￿ ￿ 1
3 and ￿￿(￿ p;1) = 1.
(a) E⁄ect of ￿ p on ￿￿(￿ p;￿) for ￿ p <
qE
2 : The ￿rst term in parentheses is (A1) is
decreasing in ￿ p because
@S(￿ p;;qE)
@￿ p ￿
@S(min[￿ p;
￿qE
2 ];￿qE)
@￿ p equals ￿d(￿ p;qE) < 0 for ￿ p 2 (
￿qE
2 ;
qE
2 )
and ￿
￿
d(￿ p;qE) ￿ d(￿ p;￿qE)
￿
< 0 for ￿ p 2 (0;
￿qE
2 ). Since licensee pro￿ts are increasing in
￿ p, (A1) is decreasing in ￿ p. Therefore, ￿￿(￿ p;￿) is increasing in ￿ p for ￿￿(￿ p;￿) 2 (0;1): Note
that the limit of the ￿rst term in (A1) as ￿ p ! 0 is strictly positive for ￿ < 1, whereas
lim
￿ p!0￿L(￿ p;￿) = 0. Therefore, there will exist some ￿ p > 0 such that ￿￿(￿ p;￿) = 0 for all
￿ 2 [0;1):
(b) E⁄ect of ￿ on ￿￿(￿ p;￿) for ￿ p <
qE
2 : The ￿rst term in parentheses is (A1) is de-
creasing in ￿ because consumer surplus for the licensee￿ s product increases with quality.
Licensee pro￿ts are increasing in ￿, so (A1) is decreasing in ￿ and hence ￿￿(￿ p;￿) is
increasing in ￿ for ￿￿(￿ p;￿) 2 (0;1). Since ￿￿(
qE
2 ;￿) = 0 for ￿ ￿ 1
3, it follows from part
(a) that the same result holds for ￿ p <
qE
2 . that ￿￿(￿ p;￿) = 0 for all ￿ p > 0. For ￿ = 1, the
￿rst term in (A1) is 0 and ￿L(￿ p;1) > 0, so ￿￿(￿ p;1) = 1. jj
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